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Abstract
Associative theory characterizes the memorial representation of a
sentence as a collection of independently linked concepts. In contrast,
Gestalt theory says that the representation underlying each proposition
expressed in a sentence is an integral unit. A review of research is
presented that indicates that previous results either have been equivocal
or have supported the Gestalt position. Three new studies are reported
that show that, when scored for gist, the proposition underlying simple
three-word sentences are recalled completely or not at all. A final
experiment indicates that one-proposition sentences containing four
content words are more likely to be recalled as a whole than three-
proposition sentences of the same length, and that fragmentary recall
of the three-proposition sentences usually preserves the unity of
constituent propositions. These results strongly support the Gestalt
position over any associative model that has been proposed.
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The Representation of Sentences in Memory
Most of the theorizing about human memory can be boiled down to just
two basic conceptions. The first, associationism, traced back at least
to Aristotle, was championed by the British associationists, and domi-
nated American psychology for more than half a century. The approach is
reductionistic and atomistic. All knowledge is said to be reducible to
a set of simple elements that are connected by simple mechanistic links,
or associations. The second approach, Gestalt psychology, developed by
Koffka and Kohler, emerged as a reaction to British empiricism and associa-
tive psychology. Although Gestalt psychology never developed the grip on
the field nor the explicit and elaborate models enjoyed by associationism,
it has provided a genuine alternative. According to the Gestalt concep-
tualization, the fundamental units of human perception and memory are
complex wholes that have emergent properties which make them irreducible
into simpler elements. That is, "the whole is more than the sum of its
parts."
While the early battlegrounds for the two approaches lay in percep-
tion and introspection, J. Anderson and Bower (1971, 1972, 1973; J. Anderson,
1976) have recently revived the conflict in the arena of sentence memory.
A key assumption of prominent associative models is that sentences are
represented as sets of independently linked concepts. In contrast to
this atomistic conception, the Gestalt hypothesis is that each idea, or
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proposition, expressed in a sentence is a well-formed whole. Once encoded
into memory, a proposition tends to resist decomposition into elemental
constituents. These two theories about the underlying memory representa-
tion for sentences lead to opposing predictions about several aspects of
sentence recall. This paper will review the evidence from sentence recall
studies which have tested these predictions,and present several new
experiments.
Special attention will be paid to the Human Associative Memory model
(HAM) of J. Anderson and Bower (1973). This has been by far the most
influential model of sentence memory. A history of this field over the
past decade would be a recounting of the attempts to test predictions of
HAM. J. Anderson (1976) has developed a successor to HAM called ACT.
Little will be said about ACT, largely because its predictions in the areas
of sentence memory with which this paper is concerned are less clear-cut
than HAM's. It should be emphasized, though, that most of the fundamental
assumptions of ACT and HAM are the same. Indeed, HAM is representative
of an entire class of associative models. Later a somewhat different
associative model proposed by Jones (1978) will be discussed in detail.
J. Anderson and Bower have employed three strategies for testing
associative and Gestalt hypotheses of sentence memory. The first examined
the repetitions of a single word in several sentences. J. Anderson and
Bower (1971) reported a study in which the verbs in SVO sentences appear
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in 1, 2, 4, or 8 sentences. Figure 1 indicates the HAM structure which
would result from a complete encoding of two sentences with a common
verb. The graph terminates in type nodes representing underlying concepts.
Insert Figure 1 about here
These are connected to the token nodes that represent occurrences of the
indicated words in sentences via the membership relation. J. Anderson
and Bower argued that object recall when cued with the subject noun should
be unaffected by verb repetition. This is predicted because the verb does
not lie on the path between the subject and the object.
Consider next the case where the learner fails to recall either the
verb or the object when cued with the subject noun. According to HAM,
such a recall failure will occur only when one or more links are missing
in the path between the subject and the verb and also one or more links
are missing in the path between the subject and the object. If the learner
is then cued with the subject and the verb of the sentence, he will only
be able to recall the object if there is an intact path between the verb
and the object. The subject of the sentence can contribute nothing to
object recall, since if there had been an intact subject-object path, the
learner would have recalled the object when cued with the subject alone.
J. Anderson and Bower (1971, p. 676) state that:
If the verb has occurred in several sentences . . . the S will
probably not be able to select with certainty the correct path
from the verb type to the appropriate object. The S in this
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predicament would have to guess among several equally likely
paths from the verb type. Hence, conditional upon non-recall
of both verb and object to the subject-only cue, the model
predicts confusion or object-competition will increase and
correct recall decrease as the verb occurs in progressively
more sentences.
It was this prediction which provided a contrast between associative and
Gestalt views and was the focus of the study. Anderson and Bower main-
tained that the Gestalt hypothesis would predict that verb repetition
would not produce any interference, even when the subject prompt alone
failed to produce any recall. Their claim was that, since each sentence
had a different subject and object, each should constitute a unique and
unconfusable whole despite verb overlap.
Sentences were presented in two lists of 32 sentences that contained
eight sentences which had different verbs, eight sentences formed by
using four verbs twice, eight sentences using two verbs four times,and
eight sentences which shared a single verb. Each sentence was cued twice;
the subject noun cue tested recall of the verb and object, which was
immediately followed by the subject-plus-verb cue for object recall. As
expected, verb repetition had no effect on object recall when cued by
the subject noun alone. More importantly, the crucial prediction came
out in favor of associative theory. That is, the probability of correctly
recalling the object to the subject plus verb cue, conditional upon having
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recalled nothing to the subject noun alone, decreased as the number of
verb repetitions increased.
A second pair of opposed predictions from the associative and
Gestalt positions were also tested. Since by the associative account,
the learner must guess between a number of equally likely candidates
when trying to recall the object from the subject and verb when the
subject alone failed, the number of object intrusions should increase
with number of verb repetitions. In contrast, according to J. Anderson
and Bower's version of the Gestalt theory, each sentence was unique and
unconfusable, and therefore, no increase in intrusions was expected.
These predictions were tested by counting the number of "intragroup
intrusions." For each of the four verb repetition conditions, intragroup
intrusions were defined as the intrusion of one of the eight objects from
sentences in that condition to an inappropriate subject-verb cue. Intra-
group intrusions showed the predicted increase. Thus, two experimental
tests supported the associative theory at the expense of the Gestalt
hypothesis. These results were crucial because this study was the first
in a series which led J. Anderson and Bower to abandon their initial Gestalt
intuitions in favor of the development of associative models of human
memory (cf. J. Anderson & Bower, 1973, p. 332). Further, J. Anderson
(1976, p. 407) pointed to these results as exemplifying the only type of
evidence favoring the associative over the Gestalt conception which has
not been disputed.
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It seems to us, however, that J. Anderson and Bower (1971) did not
adequately test associate theory. According to the passage quoted above,
the theory predicts that in order to recall the object given a subject-
verb cue, when the subject alone produced no recall, the learner must
guess between several equally likely alternatives. The number of alter-
natives is determined by the number of sentences which share the verb.
Since the subject alone failed to produce any recall, it can not aid in
this process, so there can be no bias toward the correct object. The
correct object should occur with the same frequency as the intrusion of
any one of the other objects which share that verb, each of which should
be intruded equally often. Thus, the probability of correctly recalling
the object given the subject-verb cue, when the object was not recalled
given subject alone (N),will be an inverse function of the number of
sentences in which the verb is repeated (R) and a direct function of the
conditional probability of recalling any object (A) which shares the
verb. That is:
P(OISVN) = P(AISVN)/R (1)
Equation (1) formulates the proper test of associative theory. The
prediction that J. Anderson and Bower evaluated is simply too oblique
to provide an adequate test. The test for increased intrusions is also
inadequate, since the theory allows the more precise statement that each
object that shares the verb should be intruded with the probability
P(AISVN)/R.
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Unfortunately, the data were analyzed in a manner which makes proper
evaluation of the results impossible. The strong test of the theory requires
that intrusions of objects which share a common verb be counted. J. Anderson
and Bower, however, counted "intragroup" intrusions which included intru-
sions of objects which shared a verb plus other objects from sentences
with different verbs which appeared in the same repetition condition. This
scoring system misses the point. Thus, neither of the two associative
hypotheses discussed above can be tested with the reported data, and the
study provides only tangential evidence for associative theory. Although
other studies showing interference from repeating a word have been reported
(J. Anderson & Bower, 1973, Chapters 12 & 15; J. Anderson, 1976, Chapter 8),
none has specifically contrasted associative and Gestalt theories.
Further, it is inappropriate to argue, as have J. Anderson and Bower,
that any evidence of interference produced by verb repetition is counter
to Gestalt theory. Such a claim rests on the assumption that Gestalts
are never confusable. This assumption is not necessary nor is it reason-
able. Faces and houses qualify as visual Gestalts. Yet they can be
confusable, as anyone who has attempted to recognize a distant and little
known cousin from a large family, or to locate the home of a casual friend
in a housing development,can attest. Nonetheless, Gestalt theory,
as formulated by J. Anderson and Bower (1972), does make a testable prediction
about the effects of verb repetition. If the sentence is functioning as
a holistic unit with emergent properties, then the subject plus the verb
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should make a more effective cue than is predicted by the associative
account. That is, there should be a bias toward recall of the correct
object whereas associative theory dictates that the subject noun in the
compound cue can contribute nothing. Thus, the Gestalt hypothesis
predicts:
P(OISVN) > P(ASVN)/R (2)
where associative theory predicts equality. Unfortunately, once agaiir!
the prediction can not be evaluated using the data reported.
A second line of research directly addressed the issue of whether
compound cues are effective in inducing recall over and beyond that which
would be expected from considering their elements separately. Included
here are the "crossover" experiments of J. Anderson and Bower (1972).
The basic approach was to present people with pairs of sentences which
shared a common object, such as The child hit the landlord and The minister
praised the landlord. The resulting HAM structure for a complete encoding
of this pair is shown in Figure 2. After the presentation of a list of
such sentences, recall was cued with the subject or verb alone, or a
Insert Figure 2 about here
subject-verb compound. This compound cue could come from the same
sentence (e.g., The child hit) or different sentences (e.g., The child
praised). The task was always to recall the object noun. According to
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the model, a compound cue will prompt recall if there is an intact path
from the subject to the object, or if there is an intact path from the
verb to the object. For compound cues drawn from different sentences
(SIV2), the two paths to the object do not overlap (share any links), so
the two probabilities are independent. Therefore, the probability of
recalling the object when given a compound cue from different sentences is:
P(OISIV2 ) = P(OIS) + P(0V) - P(OIS)P(V S) (3)
However, when both elements of the compound cue come from the same sentence
(S1VI), the two paths to the object overlap, so the probabilities of
intact paths are not independent. Hence, when the retrieval power of the
two compound cues is compared, the prediction is that:
P(OISIV I ) ( P OISIV 2 ) (4)
and it also follows that:
P(0OS IV:) 5 P(Ols) + P(0OV) - P(OIS)P(01V) (5)
It should be noted that these predictions do not depend upon the particular
structures posited by HAM, but follow from any associative model that
assumes independent associations and has overlapping paths for compound
cues from the same sentence and nonoverlapping paths for different sentences.
The Gestalt hypothesis is that the sentence has emergent properties
which make it more than the simple sum of its parts. Therefore, J. Anderson
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and Bower asserted, since same-sentence compounds are more similar to
the original Gestalt than single word cues, they should benefit from
configural effects. The compound cues drawn from different sentences
destroy the configuration and should not be nearly as effective. There-
fore, the direction of inequalities (4) and (5) should be reversed.
J. Anderson and Bower (1972) reported four experiments in which these
predictions were tested. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects were told to
study the sentences for a recall test. The trends in the results were
consistent with the associative predictions, although tests of inequalities
(4) and (5) were not significant. In Experiments 3 and 4, subjects were
not told of the memory test, but were asked to generate continuations
during study. In these experiments, the Gestalt predictions prevailed.
J. Anderson and Bower explained these latter results by arguing that
the continuation was added to the memory trace and that the person would
be able to spontaneously generate it at recall given part of the sentence.
The continuation could then serve as a cue for associative retrieval of the
object. Although this explanation is totally ad hoc and at odds with the
spirit of associative theory, J. Anderson and Bower were so confident of
it that they omitted mention of the offending studies in the HAM book
(J. Anderson, 1976, p. 415).
Since that time, Foss and Harwood (1975) have reported two experi-
ments in which, as a cover task to promote deep processing, subjects rated
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the meaningfulness of the sentences during study. In both of these
studies, and in two more by J. Anderson (1976, Chapter 10, Experiments
1 and 3), in which meaningfulness ratings were employed, the Gestalt
predictions prevailed. Thus, as J. Anderson (1976, pp. 416-417) points
out, whenever study instructions ensure that subjects will process the
sentences meaningfully, the Gestalt hypothesis is supported. J. Anderson
explains this result in terms of encoding specificity. That is, words
have different senses, and a word in a sentence will be encoded in the
sense appropriate to other words in the sentence. With the compound cue,
some of the context will be available to guide the learner to the appro-
priate sense. Single word cues are less likely to access the contextually
appropriate sense. Since recall will occur only if the encoding of the
cue matches its encoding during study, configural effects are predicted.
Such an explanation, however, commits the theory to a very large number
of senses, indeed, and cannot really save associative theory (see R. Anderson
& Ortony, 1975). A different account of these results has been offered by
Jones (1978), to which we shall return.
To summarize what has been covered up to this point, two types of
tests contrasting associative with Gestalt theory have either failed to
properly address the issue or have supported the Gestalt conception at
the cost of associationism. The third and final test of whether sentences
are represented as collections of independent associations or holistic
ideas is the most fundamental. While associative theory predicts fragmentary
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recall of even SVO sentences, Gestalt theory predicts that the ideas
underlying such sentences should be recalled holistically. Sharply
conflicting results have been reported by J. Anderson and Bower and by
R. Anderson. We shall review these studies and then report three new
experiments.
Associative theory predicts holistic recall of an SVO sentence only
when a complete associative network of the sentence has been encoded and
is available at recall. Missing links may cause either partial recall
(as when the S link is missing and recall is cued with the verb or object)
or total recall failure (as when the S link is missing and recall is cued
with the subject). The important point is that representation of sentences
as collections of independently linked concepts commits associative theory
to the prediction of a relatively high level of partial recall. According
to Gestalt theory, on the other hand, instances of partial recall will be
rare events. J. Anderson and Bower (1971) first addressed this issue in
the verb repetition experiment described above. In that study, recall
of both the verb and the object occurred to approximately 26% of
the subject cues across all repetition conditions. Instances of one-
word recall to subject cues ranged from 13% for sentences with unique
verbs to 43% for sentences in which the verb was used eight times.
J. Anderson and Bower (1973, Chapter 10) reported a study in which recall
of location-subject-verb-object sentences (e.g., In the park the hippie
touched the debutante) was cued with one of the four content words. In
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this study, 12% of the cues produced recall of all three remaining content
words, while partial (one- and two-word) recall occurred to 24% of the
cues.
While the high level of partial recall reported in these studies
appears to support associative theory, there is reason to question the
results. In the verb repetition experiment, the learners may have become
aware of the manipulation. For the conditions in which verbs were repeated
in several sentences, a learner might choose to ignore the sentences as
meaningful wholes and focus on the verbs. Such a learner could recall
something to subject cue by outputing one of the repeated verbs, thereby
producing partial recall. That some learners may have adopted this
strategy is suggested by the increase in verb-only recall with increasing
verb repetitions. The sentences containing four content words that were
employed by J. Anderson and Bower (1973) may have been too complex to produce
holistic recall. If these sentences were analyzed into propositions in
Kintsch's (1974) system, they would consist of two propositions. Thus,
partial sentence recall might have been observed even though the con-
stituent propositions were recalled holistically.
More important objections to these studies have been raised by
R. Anderson (1974). In all the studies cited above, J. Anderson and Bower
employed verbatim scoring. It is well known that memory for the meaning
or gist of a sentence or text may remain long after the exact words or
phrasing have been forgotten. Verbatim scoring, therefore, may classify
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as partial recall instances in which the gist of the sentence is recalled
holistically. Furthermore, instructions which stress verbatim recall at
study or at recall may cause the learner to attempt to treat the material
as word strings rather than as meaningful sentences, or to surpress recall
of a sentence element if only the gist and not the exact wording is
remembered. Either strategy would bias the results toward partial recall.
R. Anderson (1974) reported a study in which he investigated whether
the gist of simple SVO sentences is recalled holistically. Initial
processing of the sentences was manipulated by instructing the learners
either to read the sentences over silently three times (to encourage rote
memorization) or to form mental images of the events described in the
sentences (to encourage meaningful, integrative processing). Recall, cued
by the subject noun, was tested immediately or 24 hours after the study
of a list of 16 sentences. At recall, instructions assured the learners
that answers would be counted correct if they expressed the ideas of a
sentence, even if the wording was changed. The instructions stressed
that the learners should recall as much as possible, and that they should
be sure to write down any part of a sentence that they could remember,
even if they could not remember all of it. A scoring system which counted
both verbatim and gist recall was employed. Gist recall was divided into
four classes of semantically related words: synonyms, superordinates,
hyponyms (i.e., subordinates), and cohyponyms (e.g., rifle recalled for
pistol). While neither study instruction nor retention interval affected
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the level of verbatim or gist recall, the proportion of gist recall
accounted for by semantically related words increased at the longer re-
tention interval. More importantly, while verbatim scoring showed 26%
total recall and 20% partial recall, substance scoring revealed 47%
total recall as compared to only 4% partial recall. Describing the
results another way, when substance scoring was employed,whole sentence
recall accounted for 96% of all words recalled.
These results support the Gestalt hypothesis when one looks at sub-
stance recall. However, J. Anderson (1976, p. 411) has reported that
he found a relatively high level of partial recall of SVO sentences even
when substance scoring is employed. The purpose of the first experiment
was to provide a further test of the level of partial recall for simple
SVO sentences, in the hope of resolving this issue. In constructing the
materials, special care was taken to avoid the use of conceptually well-
integrated sentences for which prior knowledge or prior associations
between words might bias the results in favor of holistic recall (cf.
Rosenberg, 1968).
Experiment IA
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 74 undergraduates enrolled in an
introductory psychology class, who participated in order to fulfill a
course requirement.
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Materials and design. Sentences were constructed in the following
manner. First, 509 nouns and 395 transitive verbs were chosen at random
from the Thorndike-Lorge (1944) list. Next two nouns and a verb were
selected at random from these pools. The attempt was made to construct
a nonanomolous simple declarative sentence. When it was judged that a
sensible sentence could not be made, the words were returned to the pool.
Finally, 80 sentences created in this manner, along with 10 clearly
anomolous ones, were rated for sensibleness on a four-point scale by 48
undergraduates. The 60 sentences rated most sensible were employed in
the experiment. Using these procedures, sentences such as the following
were generated:
The clerk surprised the dog.
The general recognized the coin.
The giant claimed the lake.
The pupil admired the goose.
All of the selected sentences were rated on average as having a clear
meaning. The agents, verbs, and objects of the final 60 sentences did
not differ significantly in Thorndike-Lorge frequency, F(2,177) = 2.00.
The sentences were randomly divided into two 30-sentence lists, and
these in turn were split into three 10-sentence sublists. Sublists were
used to counterbalance cue type with sentences. For each subject, one
sublist each was cued with the agent, verb, and object, and across all
subjects, each sublist was cued with each type of cue for one-third of
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the subjects. The lists were further organized into blocks such that
half of the items in each sublist were in each block. The first block
presented was the first block tested. The purpose of the blocking pro-
cedure was to minimize recall from short-term, nonsemantic memory. Within
blocks, sentence and cue orders were independently randomized.
Procedure. Subjects received both lists in counterbalanced orders.
Sentences were presented at a 7-second rate, via tape recordings prepared
by a male radio-TV announcer, to groups of about 30 subjects. After each
list, subjects completed a test in the form of a mimeographed booklet with
one cue per page.
Preliminary instructions indicated that, "It is more important that
you grasp the ideas expressed in the sentences, than it is for you to
memorize their exact wording." The recall instructions reiterated this
point, and also stressed that, "If you cannot remember the whole sentence,
give any part you can remember." This latter sentence was underlined
on the subject's copy and emphasized by the experimenter as she read
the instructions aloud.
Scoring. Protocols were scored for both verbatim and substance
recall. Verbatim scoring allowed only abbreviations (e.g., TV for
television) and changes in number or tense. Substance scoring included
four classes of semantically related words substituted for the language
of the original, namely synonyms, close superordinates, hyponyms, and
close cohyponyms (cf. R. Anderson, 1972, 1974). The procedure was to
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prepare rosters of all nonverbatim words which appeared in the recall
protocols. Three judges then classified each response, considering the
original sentence but without knowledge of the rest of the response for
that sentence. Finally, the protocols themselves were scored. This was
simply a clerical task because the responses had been exhaustively
classified at the preceding stage.
Results
Table 1 shows the proportion of words recalled at each scoring level,
when cued by the agent, verb, and object. If recall were perfectly all-
or-none, then for each cue the proportions of the two remaining words
should be equal, and both words should be recalled as often as either of
them is recalled. Overall, on the substance measure, recall of exactly
one word constituted 6.1% of all possible recalls, as compared to 23.4%
in which both words were recalled and 70.5% for which neither word was
recalled. Instances of two-word recall accounted for 88.5% of all words
recalled. Clearly there is a strong tendency toward all-or-none memory.
Another type of evidence is the contingency between two words recalled to
a particular cue. The condition in which the agent was the cue is repre-
sentative of the data. When the agent was the cue, the probability of
recalling the verb given that the object was recalled was .893, while
the probability of recalling the verb given that the object was not
recalled was .032. These results fit quite well with those of R. Anderson
(1974),who obtained the values .959 and .039 respectively for the two
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conditional probabilities, but contrast with those of J. Anderson (1976,
p. 411),who reported probabilities of .589 and .031 for recall of the
verb when cued with the object, conditional upon recall or nonrecall of
the object.
Insert Table 1 about here
Finally, two tests were conducted of the HAM hypothesis that the
verb and object are more closely associated than is either with the agent.
Since fewer links must be traversed, recall of the verb should be better
when cued by the object than by the agent. For the substance measure,
marginal support was found for the hypothesis, F (1,146) = 4.12, p < .05,
F (1,118) = 2.15, min. F'(1,124) = 1.41. A second prediction is that the
verb cue is more likely to elicit recall of the object than of the agent.
The support for this prediction was also equivocal, F,(1,146) = 6.35, P < .05,
F (1,118) = 1.78, min. F'(1,182) = 1.39.
-2
Experiment IB
Clearly, the very high level of holistic recall in Experiment IA
supported the Gestalt hypothesis of sentence representation. However,
due to the record of conflicting results on this issue, we felt it advisable
to attempt to replicate these results. A second reason for another exper-
iment was to modify the level of learning. Arguments about sentence
memory (J. Anderson, 1976, pp. 410-411; Foss & Harwood, 1975; Jones, 1978)
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have often hinged on the assumption that the amount of whole sentence
encoding will vary with overall level of learning. Level of learning
was varied simply by changing list length. We were also troubled by the
number of intralist intrusions in IA,so the procedure of the replication
study was modified slightly in order to reduce this problem.
Method
Four lists of 15 sentences were constructed so as to minimize
semantic overlap between sentences within each list. This procedure
was designed to decrease intralist intrusions and increase the level
of recall in the cued recall test that immediately followed each list.
The materials and procedure were otherwise the same as in Experiment IA.
Ninety-three introductory psychology students participated as subjects.
Results
Table 2 shows the proportion of words recalled for each cue. Overall,
recall of exactly one word occurred 7.0%, recall of both words 41.7%,
and total recall failure 51.3% on the substance measure. Instances in
which both words were recalled accounted for 92.3% of all words recalled.
Looking at a representative interword contingency, when a sentence was
cued with the agent, the probabilities of recalling the object were .912
and .045 conditional upon recall or nonrecall of the verb. Again recall
was largely all-or-none.
Insert Table 2 about here
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The HAM prediction that the object would prove more effective at cueing
the verb than would the agent did not approach significance, F (1,184) =
1.04, F2(1,118) = .68, min. F' < 1. For the prediction that the verb would
be a better cue for the object than for the agent, F (1,184) = 1.03,
S(1,118) = .60, min. F' < 1. Thus, contrary to the trend in Experiment 1A,
-:-2
no support was found for HAM's subject-predicate distinction.
Experiment 2
It is possible that, despite the precautions taken to control for
conceptual integration, the materials used in IA and 1B exhibited, on
average, a greater degree of prior association between the verb and subject
than between the verb and object noun, and that it was these pre-experimental
influences that accounted for the failure to support the structure posited
by HAM. The quasi-random procedure did not ensure that subject and object
nouns were equated. Subject nouns were more likely to be animate, suitable
for the agent role. This difference may have spuriously increased the
strength of the relationship between the subject noun and verb, biasing
the results against HAM. Because of problems of this type, a strong test
of the subject-predicate distinction would require that subject and object
nouns be precisely equated. Reversible sentences were employed in Experiment
2 in order to provide such a test. In reversible sentences subject and
object nouns are perfectly equated, since across sentence pairs the same
nouns serve both as subject and object for each verb.
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Method
Subjects. The subjects were 36 students in
tional psychology class who participated as part
Materials. Twenty-four sentence pairs were
sensible with either noun serving as the subject.
The demonstrator hit the car.
The car hit the demonstrator.
The robber surprised the security guard.
The security guard surprised the robber.
an undergraduate educa-
of a class requirement.
constructed so as to be
For example:
The sentence pairs were randomly assigned to two sublists of 12 pairs.
Two versions of each sublist were constructed by randomly dividing each
sentence pair. The sentences were printed on quarter sheets, one to a
page and assembled in booklets in 4 different random orders.
In addition to the experimental sentences, two filler sentences per
list appeared as the last two pages of each study booklet. The filler
sentences were not tested. They served as interpolated material for the
purpose of reducing short-term memory effects.
Memory for the sentences was tested by presenting the verb of each
sentence as a cue. The test booklets were made up of the 12 verbs pre-
sented in individually randomized orders.
Design and procedure. Half of the subjects studied each version of
a sentence, and each subject studied both sublists in counterbalanced
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orders. The study instructions emphasized that subjects should go through
the booklet in order and read and think about each sentence as they would
later receive a memory test. The sentence study interval of 10 seconds
was regulated by tape recorded beeps which signaled the subjects to turn
the page to the next sentence. Immediately after each sublist,recall
was cued with the verbs.
Results
The protocols were scored for substance recall of the subject and
object nouns. In addition to verbatim responses, the substance criteria
accepted synonyms, hyponyms, close cohyponyms, and close superordinates.
The proportion of substance recall was slightly higher for subjects
than objects (.65 vs. .64), although this difference did not approach
significance. Thus, a strong test of the subject-predicate distinction,
in which possible subject-object confoundings were controlled, gave no
support for the HAM structure, because recall was almost exclusively
holistic, accounting for 96% of all words recalled.
General Discussion
The three studies reported here, as well as earlier experiments by
R. Anderson (1974), have shown that the gist of simple sentences is
recalled holistically. This result obtained over a fairly wide range of
levels of recall: roughly twice as many words or sentences were recalled
in Experiment IB as in Experiment 1A, yet the same degree of holistic
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recall was observed in both. Thus the suggestion that the extent of
holistic recall is tied to recall level was not borne out. While
J. Anderson has stated that "Whether one is going to consider this degree
of all-or-none recall as evidence for a Gestalt theory is a matter of
taste" (1976, p. 411), and that, in any case, "the Gestalt versus associa-
tive issue is not really decideable on the basis of empirical data"
(1976, p. 407), we believe that these studies provide strong support for
the Gestalt hypothesis at the expense of models positing independent
associations.
J. Anderson (1976) has invoked individual differences in order to
permit associative models to accommodate holistic recall:
We assume that subjects varied in their abilities and that they
varied in the amount of effort they expended memorizing individual
sentences. This meant that for some sentences for some subjects
all associations had a high probability of being formed while for
other sentences for other subjects all associations had a low
probability. These individual differences meant that there would
be more all-or-none recall than expected by chance, producing
contingencies in the data. The fact that probabilities of
forming links covary over individuals and sentences make it
virtually impossible to reject an associative model on the
basis of amount of all-or-none recall. (J. Anderson, 1976, p. 410)
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Available data plainly show that a simple appeal to individual differences
will not salvage an independent associations theory. First of all, there
are the alternative analyses of the results of the five experiments re-
ported by J. Anderson and Bower (1972). Taking individual differences
into account had almost no effect. Second, Foss and Harwood (1975) took
account of individual differences and still got results that strongly
contradicted associative models. Third, R. Anderson (1974) estimated for
each individual subject the parameters for each of the independent links
assumed in a HAM representation. When gist scoring was used, the means
of two of the three parameters approached 1 and their variances were
vanishingly small. According to HAM, the proportion of sentences in
which both the verb and the object will be recalled given the subject
as a cue is the product of all three parameters. However, one of the
parameters correlated almost perfectly (.97) with this proportion, so the
other two could be dropped with little loss of information. R. Anderson
(1974, p. 537) concluded that this analysis of individual variation sub-
stantiated the case that "subject-verb-object sentences are learned and
recalled as propositions on a whole-or-none basis."
Experiment 3
We have argued that the underlying meaning of a simple SVO sentence
is represented in memory as a Gestalt, or emergent whole, as evidenced
by all-or-none recall of the gist of the sentence. It is, however.
Sentence Memory
27
unreasonable to expect holistic encoding of complex sentences. It
simply does not make sense to expect people to recall sentences like
the following in an all-or-none fashion:
Helen, the most promising graduate student at the University
of Northwestern Illinois, quit school to join the circus,
but lived to regret it.
Clearly, the irreducible units of such sentences, if they exist, must
exist at some simpler level. Propositions have repeatedly been suggested
as the basic unit for the representation of text in memory. Thus, while
the sentences above will not be recalled holistically, constituent prop-
ositions such as Helen quit school may well be. The purpose of the
next study was to test whether propositions in slightly more complex
sentences are recalled holistically.
Experiment 3 relied on Kintsch's (1974) system of propositional
analysis. According to Kintsch, a proposition consists of a predicator
and one or more arguments. Predicators include concepts such as those
expressed by verbs, modifiers, relational terms, and superordinates.
Arguments are most often realized as nouns, but the use of propositions
as arguments enables the representation of propositional embeddings.
The system is based on Fillmore's (1968) casegrammar, the arguments
filling cases such as agent, instrument, and object.
Like the present authors, Kintsch has postulated that propositions
are the units of sentence memory and has attempted to empirically validate
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this claim. Kintsch and Glass (1974) reasoned that if propositions are
the units of memorial representation, then sentences which are composed
of a single proposition should be more likely to be recalled in an all-
or-none fashion than are sentences composed of multiple propositions.
They reported two studies in which single-proposition sentences were
more often recalled holistically than two- or three-proposition sentences,
when the number of content words was controlled. Experiment 3 attempted
to replicate and extend these studies. All of the sentences employed by
Kintsch and Glass were conceptually well integrated. This raises the
possibility that the results were biased in favor of holistic recall.
Both wdll and poorly integrated sentences were employed in Experiment 3.
While Kintsch and Glass studied only one type of three-proposition
sentence, six different types were employed in the present study, along
with three types of one-proposition sentence, in order to test for
generality.
In our judgment, Kintsch's scheme is just about the simplest
imaginable that has any chance of reasonable correspondence with the
way people actually code sentences. Kintsch has achieved economy of
representation in a number of ways. One is to assume that case relations
can be specified in the abstract without reference to the use being made
of particular verbs in particular contexts. Consider the following three
sentences:
The artist handed the toddler the lipstick.
The scout carried the ham to the principal.
The ballerina put the slippers on her feet.
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In Kintsch's system these are agent-verb-object-goal (AVOG) sentences.
Each is assumed to express a single proposition. The first sentence
does look as though it contains one propositon since the verb handed
seems to demand both an object and a goal. You cannot say either The
artist handed the lipstick or The artist handed the toddler. It is
evident that the goal case is optional in the second sentence. The
implication of this is that it may be better to conceive of to the
principal as connected in a separate proposition. The third sentence
is more complicated. It is possible to say The ballerina put the slippers
on, which suggests that the goal case is not obligatory. However, the
argument could be made that put on does require a goal which, however,
has the special property that it normally is highly predictable (hats
go on heads, shoes go on feet, etc.). If this is true, her feet can be
deleted because it is redundant. Thus, a subject in a memory experiment
attempting to recall the third sentence might omit the phrase even though
it expresses an integral part of the proposition.
The foregoing illustrations suggest that it will be no surprise if
Kintsch's scheme turns out to give a less than perfect account of sen-
tence memory. Even so, Experiment 3 provided at least a general test of
the Gestalt hypothesis. The only requirement was the minimal assumption
that sentences characterized in Kintsch's system as expressing three prop-
ositions are on the average propositionally more complex than sentences
characterized as expressing one proposition.
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Method
Design. There were two main factors; integratedness (integrated vs.
unintegrated sentences), a between-subjects factor; and number of prop-
ositions per sentence (one vs. three), a within-subject variable. In
addition, type of sentence was nested within number of propositions.
There were three types of one-proposition sentences and six types of
three-proposition sentences. Table 3 gives examples of integrated and
unintegrated sentences of each type as well as the propositional
representation in Kintsch's system.
Insert Table 3 about here
Subjects. The subjects were 74 undergraduates enrolled in psychology
and educational psychology classes who participated as part of a course
requirement.
Materials. All sentences were made up of four content words. There
were 60 integrated and 60 unintegrated sentences. In addition, there
were 40 filler sentences, 20 of each type. Integrated sentences were
judged to characterize ordinary, unsurprising situations. In these
sentences the actors, actions, and objects "go together." Unintegrated
sentences were constructed by describing unlikely (but still possible)
states of affairs. Judgments of integratedness were made by two native
speakers of American English.
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The sentences were constructed within the bounds of Kintsch's
propositional representation system. For each level of integration,
there were 30 one-proposition sentences (10 of each of 3 types) and
30 three-proposition sentences (5 of each of 6 types).
Subjects saw either the integrated or the unintegrated set of
sentences. The sentences were printed individually on quarter-size
sheets of paper and assembled into booklets. Every subject saw 10
booklets, each of which was made up of three one-proposition sentences,
three three-proposition sentences, and two filler sentences. The sen-
tences were randomly assigned to booklets, with the restriction that
each of the three one-proposition types and three of the six possible
three-proposition types were represented in each booklet. The order of
sentences was randomized within each booklet, except that the filler
sentences always occurred at the end. Their purpose was to eliminate
short-term memory effects in free recall, which immediately followed
each booklet. The order of booklets for each subject was determined
according to a Latin square.
Procedure. An instruction sheet which explained the procedure
enjoined the subjects not to look at any booklet until signalled, and
informed them that a recall test would follow. The instructions
stressed that accurate, although not necessarily verbatim, recall was
desired. Pages were turned at 10-second intervals,signalled by beeps
from a tape recorder. Immediately following the last sentence of each
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booklet the subjects were given a free recall test. They were told to
write each sentence, or any part thereof that they could remember, in
any order. Recall of content words was scored according to gist criteria
in which synonyms, hyponyms, close cohyponyms, and close superordinates
as well as the exact words of the original were counted correct.
Results
Proportion of Content Words Recalled
The effect of number of propositions was significant by subjects,
F (1,72) = 7.89, p < .01, but not by sentences, F (1,116) = 1.95,
reflecting a trend toward better recall of one- than three-proposition
sentences (.529 vs. .495). The effect of integration reached significance,
F (1,72) = 5.85, p < .05, F2 (1,116) = 11.34, p < .01, min. F'(1,142) = 3.86,
p < .05, with more words being recalled from integrated than unintegrated
sentences (.553 vs. .474). The Number of Propositions x Integration inter-
action was not significant, F (1,72) = 1, F2 (l,116) < 1.
Proportion of Whole Sentence Recall
As one index of holistic recall, the number of words recalled from
sentences in which all four content words were recalled was divided by
the total number of content words recalled. As predicted, there was
more whole sentence recall of one-proposition sentences (.760) than of
three-proposition sentences (.676), F1 (1,72) = 26.01, F (1,116) = 7.64,
p < .01, min. F' (1,178) = 5.91, p < .05. Surprisingly, although there was a
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trend for more holistic recall of integrated sentences than unintegrated
sentences (.747 vs. .691), the effect was not significant, F (1,72) = 2.68,
p = .11, F(1,116) = 1.96, p = .16. The Number of Propositions x Integration
interaction did not approach significance, F (1,72) and F (1,116) < 1.1 -2
The results replicate those of Kintsch and Glass (1974, Experiment 1).
In both the study by Kintsch and Glass and the present study, single-
proposition sentences did not reliably produce better total recall of
words but did significantly increase holistic recall.
The number of propositions in a sentence affected the likelihood of
holistic recall of both well and poorly integrated sentences. These ranged
from the mundane to the bizarre. What is most striking about the results
is that the number of propositions has a significant effect on whole sen-
tence recall, while conceptual integration, with all its intuitive appeal
and face validity, failed to produce a significant effect. The trend of
the results was consistent with the obvious prediction, and we do not wish
to make too much of the failure to reach significance. The relative magni-
tude of the effects does, however, highlight the strength of the effect of
number of propositions.
In order to further investigate the effect of conceptual integration
on whole sentence recall and to test for differences between the sentence
types employed in the study, separate analyses of one-proposition and three-
proposition sentences were undertaken in which conceptual integration and
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sentence type were included as factors. Nothing of special note appeared
in the analysis of single-proposition sentences. Of some interest in
the analysis of three-proposition sentences was an Integration x Sentence
Type interaction, F (5,315) = 7.19, < .01, F (5,48) = 3.41, p < .05,
min.F'(5,101) = 2.31, p < .05. Of the six types of three-proposition
sentences employed in this study, three (JJAV, JAVL, BJAV) contained
modifiers while the other three (AVAV,AVLL, AVVV) did not. For each of
the sentence types with a modifier, poorly integrated sentences exhibited
greater whole sentence recall than well integrated sentences, while the
reverse was true for the remaining sentence types. Table 4 shows the
proportion of whole sentence recall collapsed across the three types of
sentences with and without modifiers. For the sentences with two
modifiers, deletions of one or both modifiers accounted for nearly
Insert Table 4 about here
all of the difference between the well and poorly integrated conditions.
It may be that the modifers in some of the well integrated sentences
were so redundant that subjects failed to encode them or failed to
output them at recall. In the poorly integrated sentences, modifiers
may have particularized the meanings of the sentences (cf. R. Anderson,
Goetz, Pichert, & Halff, 1977) or enabled subjects to form bizarre
mental images.
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Proportion of Whole Proposition Recall
The question of primary interest here is whether propositions tend
to be recalled all-or-none. The demonstration of an effect of number of
propositions in a sentence on the recall of the whole sentence sheds only
indirect light on the issue. In the analyses that follow, the holistic
recall of propositions is examined directly.
Table 5 shows, for each three-proposition sentence type, the pro-
portion of holistic recall of component propositions. When holistic recall
of constituent propositions is considered, over 94% of the words recalled
from the well integrated three-proposition sentence types are accounted
for. Even for poorly integrated sentences, holistic recall accounted
Insert Table 5 about here
for nearly 90% of all words recalled. For four content word sentences,
there are 14 combinations of four content words taken one, two, or three
at a time. Pooling across sentence types, only 31% of the possible partial
sentence recall combinations would maintain the integrity of constitutent
propositions, yet they contributed over 80% of the observed partial recall
for the well-integrated sentences. We have reanalyzed some data from
Kintsch and Glass, and found that for their three-proposition sentences,
93% of all words recalled represented holistic propositional recall.
Clearly there is a strong tendency toward holistic recall of propositions
in the three-proposition sentences.
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Holistic recall of propositions accounted for over 90% of the words
recalled from three-proposition sentences, but only 76% of the words
from single proposition sentences. Why was there such a disparity? A
ready answer is that two or more propositions may underlie some of the
sentences that are classified as expressing one proposition in Kintsch's
system. Patterns of partial recall were examined in order to investigate
this possibility. Overall, there were 218 instances that consisted of
exactly three content words. These accounted for 66% of all words that
appeared in partially recalled sentences. In most cases the three words
formed an acceptable English sentence that expressed a coherent proposition.
Furthermore, certain arguments were much more likely to be omitted than
others. With respect to AVGO sentences, such as The customer wrote the
company a complaint, and AVOI sentences, such as The housewife killed the
roach with insecticide, it was the goal or the instrument that were most
often deleted, producing recall of the form The customer wrote a complaint
or The housewife killed the roach. This suggests that AVO is the core
proposition and that additional arguments involving goals or instruments
are joined in separate propositions. As we indicated earlier, though, we
would not care to make a general claim of this sort apart from an analysis
of specific verbs in context. However, here is not the place for a detailed
examination of alternative schemes for representing the propositions in
complex sentences. We shall content ourselves with the observation that
it is apparent that the data can be accommodated gracefully by a proposi-
tional model.
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Co-occurrence of Word Pairs
We have developed a metric to permit more fine grained analysis of
sentence recall data. The "co-occurrence index" is defined as the number
of times both of any two words from a sentence are recalled divided by
the number of times either of the two words is recalled. The co-occurrence
Insert Table 6 about here
index means for word pairs drawn from the same propositionand from
different propositions are shown in Table 6. A strong form of the Gestalt
hypothesis may seem to imply that the co-occurrence index will approach I
for all same-proposition word pairs. A closer examination, however, will
show that this strong prediction only holds when the same words do not
play a role in more than one proposition. Three-proposition sentences
with four content words necessarily contain words that appear as arguments
in more than one proposition. For example, the agent in the BJAV sentences
appears in two propositions. Thus, if a subject recalls only the agent
and verb from a BJAV sentence the co-occurrence index will be less than 1
even though only whole propositions are recalled. A weaker prediction,
which can be justified for the present material, is that the pairs of
words from the same proposition should be more likely to co-occur than
pairs of words from different propositions. Table 6 reveals that the
co-occurrence index means show the predicted trend for every one of the
three-proposition sentence types in both integrated and unintegrated forms.
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In order to test the strength of the relationship between the prop-
osition membership and co-occurrence, multiple regression analyses were
conducted in which the dependent variable was the co-occurrence index of
each word pair from a three-proposition sentence,and the predictors were
proposition membership (same or different), surface order distance (number
of intervening words between the pair members), and conceptual integration.
The correlation matrix is shown in Table 7. Proposition membership proved
the best predictor of co-occurrence. In a stepwise multiple regression,
proposition membership was the first predictor entered, F(1,59) = 26.8,
p < .01. The multiple correlation rose from 0.18 with surface distance and
integration as predictors to .28 when propositional membership was added.
Insert Table 7 about here
A HAM representation of each sentence type was developed. The number
of intervening links in HAM between word pairs correlated -. 0002 with
the co-occurrence index. Since in HAM the degree of contingency between
word pairs is determined by the number of intervening links, this provides
telling evidence against the HAM representation.
In summary, the present data support the hypothesis that propositions,
construed in the manner outlined by Kintsch (1974), are the units of repre-
sentation of sentences in memory. Aspects of the recall of allegedly
single-proposition sentences, however, suggest that further refinement of
propositional theory is required.
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General Discussion
The studies reported here provide compelling evidence for the Gestalt
hypothesis that the memory representation for themeaningof sentences
consists of holistic units. The first three experiments established that
the proposition expressed by a simple SVO sentence is such a unit. The
final experiment suggests that propositions such as those defined by
Kintsch (1974) are the memory units of complex sentences. A compact
summary of the present studies is the following: If a word expressing
one of the concepts of a proposition is recalled, then the odds are 9
or more in 10 that the rest of the proposition also will be recalled.
Associative models such as HAM, which represent sentences as collections
of independent associations, are fundamentally inconsistent with so high
a level of holistic recall. Furthermore, Experiments IA, 1B, and 2
failed to provide any support for the HAM representational assumption
that the verb and object are closer together in SVO sentences than the
verb and the subject. Experiment 3 showed that a poor job was done pre-
dicting patterns of recall of complex sentences on the basis of HAM-like
representations. Finally, a detailed reexamination of the verb repetition
and compound cue studies that have also tested associative and Gestalt
theory, revealed that these studies either have produced ambiguous results
or else have disconfirmed associative hypotheses. As was explained at
length earlier (see also R. Anderson & Ortony, 1975; Foss & Harwood, 1975;
Jones, 1978), modifications of HAM which have attempted to accommodate
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negative results are neither tractable nor consistent with an associative
conceptualization. We therefore conclude that the evidence from sentence
memory studies now overwhelmingly favors the Gestalt over HAM-type associa-
tive theories.
We turn now to another and somewhat different associative theory of
sentence memory developed by Jones (1978), which he calls "fragmentation"
theory. According to this theory, upon being presented with a sentence,
a person encodes a fragment which is any combination of the lexical items
of the sentence. The theory is indifferent as to whether a sentence will
be encoded in whole or in part, and if in part, which part. Recall of a
fragment occurs if and only if it is cued with one of its components.
Although fragment recall is regarded as holistic, fragmentation theory
should not be confused with Gestalt theory as discussed in this paper.
Jones, in fact, argues that the hypothesis is more representative of true
associationism than is HAM. Fragmentation theory arose from the direct
examination of experimental data whereas, according to Jones, "the design
of HAM was greatly shaped by non-experimental factors such as intuitive
plausibility and computational feasibility" (p. 366).
Fragmentation theory appears to provide a highly satisfactory account
of a range of sentence recall data. For instance, Jones (1978) reanalyzed
the results from four sentence memory experiments by J. Anderson and Bower
(1973, Chapter 10). In each case, the fragmentation model provided a
better fit to the data than HAM,and in only one experiment did the
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deviations between predicted and observed values reach significance.
Jones also was able to provide fragmentation theory interpretations of
the compound cue experiments.
Despite the seemingly impressive array of evidence, fragmentation
theory is open to serious challenge. First, and most fundamentally, the
theory does not predict what sorts of fragments will be encoded. The
composition and relative likelihood of the various fragments is determined
a posteriori. Thus, it provides a very weak account of sentence memory
vis-a-vis a propositional theory,which in principle, if not completely in
fact, specifies a priori what the holistic units will be.
To the extent that fragmentation theory addresses the relative likeli-
hood of the fragments at all, it is inconsistent with the available data.
Jones (1978, p. 364) has asserted that the probability that a subject will
encode a complete simple sentence (SVO fragment) will vary with the level
of learning and recall. In Experiments iA and IB reported in this paper,
level of learning was manipulated by varying list length. Recall was
twice as high in 1B as in IA, yet the proportion of holistic recall to
total recall was the same. In previous research, R. Anderson (1974, p. 540)
found that subjects who received imagery instructions recalled over twice
as much as subjects instructed to orally rehearse sentences; however, the
proportion of holistic recall to total words recalled was the same,
namely .96.
Sentence Memory
42
The assumption that the relative amount of holistic encoding varies
as a function of level of learning was the key to Jones' attempt to inter-
pret the data from the "crossover" experiments. To recapitulate, under
the crossover condition, people are cued with the subject and verb of
different sentences for recall of an object common to both sentences.
Jones argued that fragmentation theory predicted that different-sentence
cues could be more or less effective than same-sentence cues. He asserted
that the direction of the effect is tied to level of learning. When the
level is low, as in the Foss and Harwood (1975) studies, it is assumed
that subjects found the sentences too difficult to learn and remember in
their entirety. Given this assumption, the fragmentation hypothesis
predicts that same-sentence cues will be more effective. When level of
learning is high, subjects encode more whole sentence "fragments," and
fragmentation theory predicts that the results should be reversed, as
originally found by J. Anderson and Bower (1972, Experiment 1).
The research summarized above suggests that the fragmentation theory
explanation of the crossover experiments is not tenable. Regardless of
level of learning, the amount of partial recall will always be very small
relative to the amount of holistic recall. Because this is true, the
prediction that can be derived from fragmentation theory (Jones, 1978,
p. 364, Equation 6) is that cues from the same sentence will never be
as effective as cues from different sentences in evoking recall of a term
common to both sentences. Hence, the interpretation of the Foss and
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Harwood (1975) experiment, which did show same-sentence cues to be superior,
is called into question.
In another type of compound cue study, people have been asked to
recall the object of a simple sentence given as cues the subject, the
verb, or both the subject and the verb. A prediction from fragmentation
theory (Jones, 1978, p. 364) is as follows:
P(0osv) - P(01S) + P(OIV) (6)
The results were consistent with (6) in seven of ten compound cue experi-
ments (J. Anderson, 1976; J. Anderson & Bower, 1972; Foss & Harwood, 1975).
Foss and Harwood have shown that this is not much of an achievement,
however. In the first place theoutcome is a logical certainty when
P(01S) + P(01V) > 1 since P(OISV) cannot exceed 1. With respect to the
range from 0 to 1, Foss and Harwood fit an equation to their own data
which indicated that (6) would hold just in case P(OIS) + P(OJV) _ .51.
The means from the ten experiments are ordered perfectly in terms of this
value. That is, (6) was confirmed in the seven experiments in which the
quantity P(OIS) + P(OIV) was more than .51; it was contradicted in the
three experiments in which the quantity was less than .51.
The core of fragmentation theory is the symmetry assumption. The
probability of recall of a fragment must be the same for each cue that
is an element of that fragment, namely the probability that the fragment
was encoded. Inspection of Table 1 and 2 reveals that this assumption
Sentence Memory
44
was grossly violated by the data of the present studies (see also Gentner,
1977). For example, in Experiment IA the verb was little more than half
as effective at cueing gist recall as were either the subject or object,
although all three must be equivalent according to the theory. A final
problem is that since fragmentation theory says recall can happen if and
only if a fragment is cued by one of its constituents, it is incompatible
with studies which have shown that sentence recall can be cued with words
that did not occur in the sentence (e.g., R. Anderson & McGaw, 1973;
R. Anderson & Ortony, 1975; R. Anderson, Pichert, Goetz, Schallert, Stevens,
& Trollip, 1976). In sum, Jones' fragmentation theory provides an un-
appealing alternative to propositional-Gestalt theory, an alternative which
we believe can be rejected.
When one defends, as we do, a strong Gestalt position on sentence
memory, the question that must be asked is why any partial recall is
observed. The answer is that there are reasonable explanations for
occasional failures. First, there is some chance that a learner will
mishear or misread a sentence. This may lead to recall of a word that
is orthographically or acoustically but not semantically related to the
original. A second source of apparent partial recall are intrusions which
occur when there is semantic overlap among sentences in a list. An adjusted
substance score was developed that discounted orthographic and acoustic
confusions, subject-object reversals, and intralist intrusions. With
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respect to Experiments 1A and IB, when the adjusted measure was computed,
the level of holistic recall was very high indeed, .98 and .97 respectively.
It is now generally acknowledged that language comprehension is a
constructive process and that what people encode into their heads will
not always be veridical representations of the sentences they see or hear.
Another reason for an occasional apparent fragment in sentence recall
arises from this fact. Elements of recall based on a constructed and
elaborated representation may not be counted as sufficiently faithful
reproductions of the originals. Yet, if a holistic propositional theory
is correct, even "intrusions" ought to bear some semantic resemblance to
the words they replace. Graesser (1978) has presented an analogous argu-
ment about forgetting that also predicts semantic overlap between intrusions
and the words of the original. He has reported two experiments that
showed the expected overlap. His results provide subtle support for a
holistic, propositional theory but are difficult to understand in terms of
a theory which says that sentences are represented in memory as colliga-
tions of loosely associated concepts. Graesser's work also provides
further evidence that the more strict the criteria for judging recall,
the higher the incidence of apparent instances of fragmentary, nonproposi-
tional recall.
There remains a hard core of instances of partial recall that involves
omissions of sentence elements--that is, cases in which there are blank
spaces in subjects' protocols. These are more difficult, but still not
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impossible, to reconcile within a holistic, propositional theory. It
might be proposed that omissions occur because subjects sometimes edit
their output according to strict criteria. Assume that people store in
memory both a conceptual representation and some traces for the surface
form of the message. Sentence remembering typically begins with the
retrieval, or generation, of the conceptual representation. Next the
representation is coded into language and there is a check to see if
there is a trace for this surface form in memory. If a match can be
verified, the verbatim response is made. If there is not a match, the
response might be made anyway, resulting in the substitution of a
semantically-related word for the literal sentence element. However,
under some circumstances, such as when the demand characteristics of the
experiment tilt toward literal reproduction of the language of the study
sentences, subjects may suppress elements that fail the hypothesized
surface form check. There is ample precedent in the human memory literature
for a generation-verification mechanism along these lines.
It appears possible to explain instances of fragmentary recall in
terms of encoding perturbations such as acoustic confusions, substitutions
of semantically-related words that do not meet scoring criteria, and
suppression of words that cannot be verified against traces for the surface
forms of the originals. The important point, though, is that, whatever
is made of instances of partial recall, there are very few of them. In
simple sentences and complex ones, ordinary sentences and strange ones,
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whether learned well or poorly, whether cued or freely recalled, people
almost always recall whole propositions.
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Nested propositions which, for example, appear in the AVLL sentences
were treated according to the following rule: If proposition P is nested
in P2,then P2 is completely specified if all of the arguments of P1 are
recalled (i.e., Pl is completely specified) and all additional arguments
from P2 are recalled.
2We are grateful to Walter Kintsch for providing his data.
3Nested proportions were treated as follows: If proposition Pl is
nested within P2, then any pair of words both of which appear in P or
P2 will be counted as having occurred in the same proposition.
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Table 1
Mean Proportion of Words Recalled, Experiment IA
Cue
Word
Recalled
Agent
Verb
Object
Both Words
Agent
Verb
Object
Both Words
Agent
.193
.263
.158
--- ,,. 1
.298
.309
.276
Verb
.144
.148
.116
.165
.186
.149
Object
.250
.203
.152
.300
.329
.277
Total
.197
.198
.206
.142
.232
.314
.248
.234
Level of
Scoring
Verbatim
Substance
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Table 2
Mean Proportion of Words Recalled, Experiment B1
Cue
Word
Recalled
Agent
Verb
Object
Both Words
Agent
Verb
Object
Both Words
Agent
.385
.489
.340
--M--
.506
.532
.485
Verb
.292
.302
.260
.322
.328
.302
Object
.446
.380
.308
.497
.525
Total
.369
.382
.396
.303
.410
.516
.430
.417.463
Level of
Scoring
Verbatim
Substance
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Table 3
Examples of Types of Sentences
One-Proposition
AVGO
Integrated
Unintegrated
AVSG
Integrated
Unintegrated
AVOI
Integrated
Unintegrated
Three-Propos ition
AVAV (Implied)
Integrated
Unintegrated
AVLL or AVTT
Integrated
Unintegrated
JJAV
Integrated
Unintegrated
The customer wrote the company a complaint.
(wrote, A: customer, 0: complaint, G: company)
The comedian supplied glassware to the convicts.
The pilot flew from New York to Los Angeles.
The pony danced from the theater to the church.
(danced, A: pony, S: theater, G: church)
The housewife killed the roach with insecticide.
(killed, A: housewife, 1: insecticide, 0: roach)
The chief marked the building with a rock.
The baby died and the parents cried.
[((died, E: baby) = a) & ((cried, A: parents)= =)
& (cause, a,1)]
The mail arrived and the driver worked.
The leaves fell during a storm in the autumn.
The accountant lay in the garden in the mall.
[((lay, A: accountant) = a) & (loc: garden, a)
& (loc: mall, a)]
The pretty young girl flirted.
[(pretty, A: girl) & (young, A: girl)
& (flirted, A: girl)]
The bedraggled intelligent model sang.
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Table 3 (continued)
AVVV
Integrated
Unintegrated
JAVL
Integrated
Unintegrated
BJAV
Integrated
Unintegrated
Note: The Kintsch
one example
(E) instead
The batter hit, ran, and scored.
The engineer donated, drove, and listened.
[(donated, A: engineer) & (drove, A: engineer)
& (listened, A: engineer)]
The famous professor lectured in the classroom.
[(famous, A: professor) & ((lectured, A: professor)
= a) & (loc: classroom, a)]
The ragged boots rested on the grating.
The dangerously weak staircase creaked.
The tremendously expensive pickle rotted.
[(tremendously, expensive) & (expensive, E: pickle)
& (rotted, E: pickle)]
style representation is given in parentheses following
of each type. Some sentences involved an experiencer
of an agent.
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Table 4
Proportion of Whole Sentence Recall of
Three-Proposition Sentence
Modi fiers
No Modifiers
Integrated
.63
.78
Unintegrated
.72
.63
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Table 5
Holistic Recall of Three-Proposition Sentences
by Sentence and Proposition
Inte rated Un i ntegrated
AVAV
Whole Sentence .86 .71
Propositions
AIV ,A2V2  .04 .12
Total Holistic Recall .90 .82
AVLL
Whole Sentence .73 .70
Propositions
AV,AVL ,AVL2  .22 .17
Total Holistic Recall .95 .87
JJAV
Whole Sentence .56 .69
Proposi t ions
J A,J2A,AV,JI 2A,J AV,J2AV .39 .28
Total Holistic Recall .95 .98
AVVV
Whole Sentence .79 .53
Propositions
AV AV2AV3,AV VAVIV3,AV2V3  .19 .35
Total Holistic Recall .98 .88
JAVL
Whole Sentence .76 .77
Propositions
JA,AV,JAV,AVL .19 .12
Total Holistic Recall .96 .89
BJAV
Whole Sentence .59 .74
Propositions
BJ,JA,AV,BJA,JAV .34 .17
Total Holistic Recall .92 .91
Total
Whole Sentence .72 .69
Propositions .23 .20
Total Holistic Recall .94 .89
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Table 6
Co-occurrence Index Means for Word Pairs
in Same and Different Propositions
Integrated Unintegrated
Same Different Same Different
One-Proposition
AVGO .844 n.a. .797 n.a.
AVSG .858 n.a. .736 n.a.
AVOI .810 n.a. .797 n.a.
Total .837 n.a. .779 n.a.
Three-Proposition
AVAV .863 n.a. .835 .661
AVLL .804 .741 .740 .698
JJAV 
.723 .624 .803 .735
AVVV 
.851 .832 .636 .605
JAVL .800 .781 .804 .741
BJAV .736 .620 .768 .736
Total .806 .715 .759 .690
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Table 7
Correlations of Co-occurrence Index
and Sentence Characteristics
Measure
Co-occurrence Index (C)
Integration (1)
Surface Distance (S)
Proposition Membership (P)
C I S P
.14 .12 .26
0 .14
- .33
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Figure Captions
HAM representation of two sentences with a common verb.
HAM representation of two sentences sharing a common object.
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
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